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The transportation o f nuclear materials is on the increase. 
Although nuclear shipments are only a very small fraction o f the 
Nation’s hazardous materials shipments, they attract a great deal o f 
public attention. Shipments o f spent nuclear fuel and nuclear wastes 
are a particular concern.
One o f the many fears that people have about nuclear energy is 
the possibility that a nuclear shipment might somehow go awry and 
cause a serious public hazard. Primarily, they are worried that a 
shipment o f spent reactor fuel or highly radioactive waste could be 
involved in a serious rail or highway accident and dump its contents 
all over the countryside.
Is that really possible? How safe are those shipments? How 
many are there? What do they look like? Are the packages tested? 
These and other questions are answered in this paper. Since public 
risk is the product o f the consequences o f an accident and its 
probability, both aspects are presented so that each o f us can make 
up his own mind whether the risk from nuclear shipments is 
acceptable.
Introduction
We live in a world o f hazards. We are surrounded by threats to 
our health, our welfare, and our economy. Amongst the many 
hazards we face is the one involving the transportation o f hazardous 
materials. One of the hazardous materials with which we must 
concern ourselves is nuclear material.
Public safety in the transportation o f hazardous materials has 
been the subject of increasing emphasis. An article in the May 1970 
issue o f  the Reader’s Digest stated, “ Transportation o f hazardous 
materials on our roads, railroads, and waterways is a major and 
growing problem. One o f every ten trucks rolling toward you on the 
highway today carries explosives, flammables. or poison. 111
Questions have arisen in numerous public hearings on nuclear 
reactor operations with regard to the adequacy o f public safety in 
the transportation o f nuclear materials to and from nuclear reactors 
and fuel reprocessing plants. This paper presents a summarized 
status report on the potential hazards o f shipping those nuclear 
materials. Since there have been no serious releases o f nuclear 
materials in transportation accidents during the 25-year life o f the 
Atomic Energy Commission, the paper is based on a theoretical 
analysis o f accident risks.
What Is Shipped?
Nuclear power will play an increasingly important role in 
meeting the Nation’s energy requirements. As nuclear power 
increases, the quantities o f nuclear materials which must be shipped 
will also increase.
The operation o f nuclear power reactors will usually require the 
transportation o f three different types o f materials to and from 
reactor facilities. Unirradiated ( “ cold”  or “ fresh” ) nuclear reactor 
fuel elements are transported from fuel fabricators to the reactor. 
Irradiated ( “ spent” ) fuel elements and nuclear wastes are shipped 
from reactor facilities to fuel reprocessing plants and to disposal 
sites. Also, the radioactive products o f the spent fuel reprocessing 
plants consist primarily o f recycled nuclear fuel materials shipped to 
fuel fabricators or processors and both high-level and low-level waste 
shipped to disposal sites.
Other shipments o f radioactive materials are made in support o f 
nuclear power plant operations. For example, uranium concentrate, 
produced from uranium ore, is shipped from uranium milling plants 
in the western United States to uranium conversion facilities for 
conversion o f the uranium concentrate to uranium hexafluoride. 
Uranium hexafluoride is shipped to one o f the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) uranium enrichment facilities. The enriched 
uranium hexafluoride is then shipped to other plants which convert 
the material to uranium oxide which is then fabricated into fresh 
reactor fuel elements.
The Department o f Transportation (DOT) has estimated (2) 
that there are nearly 1.000.000 packages o f nuclear materials 
shipped each year. About 95 percent o f the shipments involve small 
quantities o f nuclear isotopes for use in industry, medicine, 
agriculture, and education. By comparison, the total number o f 
shipments of nuclear materials to and from nuclear power plants in 
197| probably numbered only a few thousand. (31 By the year 
2000. however, the numbers of shipments to and from nuclear 
power plants will probably increase by at least 100 and perhaps as 
much as 1.000. (4]
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Shipments o f nuclear materials are not readily distinguishable 
from shipments o f other hazardous materials being transported in 
routine commerce. They look like ordinary shipments. They are 
usually handled and loaded in an ordinary manner, using ordinary 
freight handling equipment. They are transported on a worldwide 
basis, like other shipments, in the cargo compartment o f an airplane, 
in a closed trailer or railroad boxcar, on “ low boys”  over highway, 
or on heavy duty flatcards by rail.
They are not readily distinguishable, but there is a difference. 
Nuclear materials, like many other materials, have hazardous 
properties. These properties must be considered in the 
transportation o f nuclear materials-considered from the viewpoints 
o f possible radiation exposure to people, contamination o f property, 
and overall effect on the environment. As a result o f the depth o f 
research studies o f the hazards and experience in the handling of 
nuclear materials, their properties are better understood than the 
hazardous properties o f most other hazardous materials being 
transported in far greater volume.
The packaging requirements for nuclear materials are designed 
to provide a high degree of protection and safety for personnel and 
materials, during both normal conditions o f transportation and 
severe accidents.
Principles Of Nuclear Shipment Safety
Protection o f the public and the transportation workers from 
radiation during the shipments o f nuclear fuel and waste is achieved 
by a combination of limitations on both the contents (according to 
the quantities and types of radioactivity) and the package design. 
Because shipments move in routine commerce, and on conventional 
transportation equipment, they are, therefore, subject to normal 
transportation accident environments [5] just like other nuclear 
cargo. The shipper has essentially no control over the likelihood of 
an accident involving his shipment. He does have control over the 
consequences o f accidents by controlling the package design, 
contents, and external radiation levels. Safety in transportation does 
not depend upon special handling or special routing.
In the transportation of all types o f hazardous materials, there 
is a difference between potential hazards and realized damage. For 
hazardous materials, a system o f protection is used to reduce the 
likelihood of the potential hazard from becoming a reality. A highly 
developed and sophisticated system of protection has evolved for 
the transportation of nuclear materials. This system is based upon a 
simple principle-if a package contains enough radioactivity (“ Type 
B”  quantity) to present a significant risk of injury or large property 
loss if released, then the package (“ Type B”  package) must be 
designed to retain its contents during severe transportation 
accidents. [5,6) Lesser quantities (“ Type A”  quantities) do not 
require as much protection, but still must be packaged in high 
quality “ Type A ”  packaging. In addition, all packages (Type A and 
B) are required to completely retain their contents during normal 
conditions of transportation.
The basic principles of safety are translated into the Federal 
Government regulations.
Government Regulations
The transportation of nuclear materials is subject to the 
regulations of both the DOT (7 J and the AEC. [8] The DOT 
Hazardous Materials Regulations also provide for safety in shipment 
o f other more routinely shipped hazardous materials- materia Is 
which are flammable, unstable, poisonous, explosive, or corrosive. 
The same basic safety standards governing shipments o f nuclear 
materials in the United States are in worldwide use through the 
regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency. (9)
In addition, the packages must provide adequate radiation 
shielding to limit the radiation exposure to transportation workers 
and the general public. For spent fuel, the package must have heat 
dissipation characteristics to protect against overheating from 
radioactive decay heat. For both fresh and spent fuel, package 
design must also provide nuclear criticality safety under both normal 
transportation and severe accident conditions.
Package designs are reviewed by the AEC prior to use in order 
to verify the adequacy o f the design parameters. I f  it appears that 
the package will, in fact, meet the regulatory requirements, [7,8] 
the AEC will issue a certificate o f approval for the package.
Shipment Information
DOT regulations specify the type o f information which must 
appear on bills o f lading and other shipping papers. Packages are 
required to be labeled appropriately. Warning placards generally 
must be placed on the transporting vehicle. This puts the carrier and 
emergency personnel on notice that they are handling shipments o f 
hazardous goods. It alerts them to the fact that applicable state and 
local regulations and ordinances need to be followed.
Quality Assurance
The adequacy o f the package design can be compromised or 
circumvented by errors which occur during fabrication, maintenance, 
or use o f the package. The person loading and closing the package 
could make errors. Perhaps one or more bolts could be left out or 
not properly tightened; a gasket could be misplaced or omitted; a 
brace or “ holddown” piece could be left off. The chances o f such 
an error are limited because o f the procedures required by the 
regulations for examination o f the package prior to each shipment, 
including tests for leak tightness, where necessary. Redundancy o f 
safety features on the package will reduce the consequences o f such 
operational errors, should they occur.
Use of the wrong materials or errors in fabrication also could 
result in a package failing to function properly during 
transportation. Adequate quality assurance programs increase the 
likelihood that such errors would be detected and corrected, prior 
to use. The regulations [8 ] impose certain quality assurance 
requirements on package manufacturers. The shipper is required to 
determine that each package meets the approved design 
specifications.
Types of Radioactive Waste
Different types o f radiation have different penetrating abilities. 
For example, alpha particles have a very short range in air and 
cannot even penetrate a piece o f paper; beta particles travel over a 
larger distance, but can still be shielded completely by light, 
low-density materials such as aluminum; gamma rays require thicker 
or more dense shielding materials such as lead and steel. The chief 
hazard to human beings from alpha materials would be from 
deposition o f the materials within the body, so special care must be 
taken in containment o f the alpha wastes. Beta-gamma wastes also 
require maintenance o f container shielding.
There are several different types o f materials which may be 
found in nuclear wastes. Nuclear wastes which are shipped around 
the country to various processing, storage, or burial sites fall into 
three general categories: (1) low specific activity (LSA) wastes; (2) 
high-level wastes; and (3 ) other wastes.
Low specific activity wastes are those which contain such low 
concentrations or quantities of radioactivity that they do not 
present any significant environmental hazards. Even if they were 
released from their packages in a transportation accident, they 
would not present much hazard to the public. Like any other
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freight spilled at the scene of an accident, they would have to be 
cleaned up because o f their nuisance value. Under U.S. and 
international regulations, they require only normal industrial 
packaging for shipment and require no special rail cars or other 
transport vehicles. LSA wastes may include such things as residues 
or solutions from chemical processing: building rubble, metal, wood, 
and fabric scrap; glassware, paper, and plastic; solid or liquid plant 
waste, sludges, and acids; and slightly contaminated equipment or 
objects.
Alpha wastes, high-level wastes, and other wastes contain 
sufficiently laige amounts of radioactivity that they have a 
significant potential for injury or property damage if released to the 
environment during a transportation accident. For that reason, DOT 
and AEC regulations require that they be packaged such that, even 
in the event of a severe transportation accident, there would be no 
significant release o f radioactive materials outside o f the containers. 
The packages (Type B packages) must then be strong enough to 
withstand the types of impact and puncture forces and fire effects 
which are often encountered in severe accidents.
High-level wastes are those solidified wastes from the 
reprocessing of highly irradiated nuclear reactor fuels. These wastes 
have such a high radioactive content o f long-lived isotopes that they 
require long-term storage in isolation and essentially perpetual 
surveillance of the storage sites. The radiation level is high enough 
to produce considerable heat, and the material must be heavily 
shielded. The most common type o f high-level waste shipments will 
be the solidified (process) waste from the nuclear fuel reprocessing 
plants. Only solid materials of this type will be shipped to waste 
storage sites. Shipments o f high-level liquid wastes are not presently 
allowed by the DOT, and are not practical due to problems in 
designing safe containers for bulk shipment of such liquids.
Alpha wastes usually consist o f materials which are 
contaminated with alpha radiation emitters such as plutonium or 
other transuranium nuclides. They have very low levels o f 
penetrating gamma radiation and so do not require heavy shielding. 
Alpha emitters have the potential for causing contamination o f 
objects or people if  released from their packages. If the amount of 
nuclear material exceeds certain levels o f concentration, the alpha 
wastes must be packaged in Type B packages, but o f a different 
type than the very heavy high-level waste packages. The emphasis in 
packaging for transportation is containment, with several 
containment barriers provided in the packaging system.
Other wastes are predominantly o f the beta-gamma type (e.g., 
fission product, industrial isotopes) which usually requires some 
shielding material as a part o f the package. This waste may also be a 
combination o f LSA. alpha, and beta-gamma types. Beta-gamma
waste includes such things as irradiated reactor structural 
components, heavily contaminated objects, concentrated solidified 
sludges or evaporator bottoms, and nonrecoverable radioactive fuel 
scrap. Because o f  the presence o f considerable quantities o f nuclear 
material, packages o f these materials must also be capable o f 
resisting severe accident.
Package Integrity
Before a specific type of Type A package is approved by the 
AEC' for shipment of nuclear materials, it must be capable o f 
withstanding, without leakage, a series of “ torture test”  which 
produce damage conditions comparable to the actual damage a 
package might encounter in a hypothetical severe transportation 
accident. The accident damage test sequence specified in the DOT 
and AEC regulations includes a 30-foot fall onto a solid unyielding 
surface, followed by a 40-inch drop onto a 6-inch diameter piston, 
followed by exposure for 30 minutes to a I475°F fire. A water 
immersion test is also required.
This test sequence represents the type of damage which might 
occur to a package in a high-speed truck accident or train 
derailment, causing the package to impact on a hard surface (such as 
a bridge abutment) and then to smash through wreckage or onto 
rocks, and then to be directly involved in a 2-4 hour cargo fire, and 
then to roll down into a river! The regulations therefore offer a very 
high degree of assurance that a package will not breach under severe 
accident conditions.
A specific safety analysis report must be prepared for each 
package type and evaluated by the AEC before use. Only if the 
packaging has successfully passed such rigorous evaluations does the 
DOT authorize its use. At present, there are several hundred 
different types o f  radioactive material package designs that have 
been authorized, ranging in size from small packages weighing a few 
pounds to massive casks weighing over 100 tons.
Packaging Methods
Fresh Fuel. A "typical”  package for a “ typical”  [16J light water 
reactor fuel is a cradle assembly consisting o f a rigid beam or 
“ strongback” and a clamping assembly which holds a few fuel 
elements firmly to the strongback. The strongback is shock-mounted 
to a steel outer shell. Fresh fuel elements might also be shipped in 
steel boxes which are positioned in an outer wooden box by a 
cushioning material. These packages, also with a few fuel elements 
inside, would be about 2 to 3 feet in diameter or cross section, and 
about 1 7 feet long. They would weigh from 1.000 to 9.000 pounds. 









Spent Fuel. Because irradiated fuel elements are highly radioactive, 
their containers must be very heavily shielded. A typical “ cask” 
used for shipping spent fuel would weigh between 20 and 75 tons. 
It would be constructed of thick steel walls filled with a dense 
shielding material such as lead, tungsten, or depleted uranium. Each 
cask would carry 1-7 PWR elements, or 2-18 BWR elements. The 
casks would be generally cylindrical in shape, and perhaps 5 feet in 
diameter and 15 to 18 feet long. A recently designed cask o f this 
type is shown in Figures 3 and 4.
The cask must not only provide radiation shielding, but must 
also provide the means to dissipate the large amount o f heat 
(perhaps 75,000 BTU/hr) produced by radioactive decay. Water is 
usually used in the central cavity as a heat medium or primary 
coolant to transfer the decay heat from the fuel elements to the 
body o f the cask. The heat is usually dissipated by natural processes 
to the air through fins on the surface of the cask. For some o f the 
larger casks, air may be forced over the fins by blowers to increase
the cooling. In other casks, heat exchanges with cooling coils 
running into the body o f the cask literally pumps the heat out and 
into the atmosphere. Reliable, redundant systems are used where 
such mechanical systems are relied upon to ensure adequate cooling. 
[ 12]
High-Level Nuclear Waste. At the present time, the AEC is planning 
on long-term storage o f all high-level wastes from commercial fuel 
reprocessing plants at a Federal waste repository or engineered 
storage facility. Some intermediate level fission product wastes may 
be further treated for separation into high-level and low-level 
components, the former of which would be destined for shipment 
to a Federal storage facility, and the latter for shipment to 
commercial burial facilities.
Shipping containers for high-level waste shipments will be very 
similar in their basic design to the shielded casks routinely used to 
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Approximate weight of cask 
and shipping assembly:
empty 70 tons 
loaded 82 tons
FIXED COOLING OUCT
R E O U N O A N T  E N G I N E / B L O W E R  
C O O L I N G  S Y S T E M
MOO TON CAPACITY PLAT CAR
FIGURE 4
IR R A D IA TED  FUEL CASK ON RAIL CAR
reprocessing site. Spent fuel is very similar in its overall shipping 
characteristics to canisters o f  high-level waste in that it is highly 
radioactive and generates considerable heat. In both cases, the 
shipping casks would be essentially the same type-large steel casks, 
lined with lead, steel or uranium. The high-level waste actually will 
be in a burial capsule or canister within the outer shielded cask. The 
waste is inert, immobile, solid material which is nonexplosive, 
noncombustible, and cannot turn to gaseous form and become 
airborne. These high-level waste casks would be transported by rail 
on conventional heavy duty flat cars. Highway load limits, rather 
than safety reasons, will restrict highway shipments.
No detailed cash designs have yet been submitted by industry 
for AEC approval, since shipments to a storage facility will probably 
not begin dptU the early 1980’ s. 118 ]
Low-Level Nuclear Waste. Under the DOT regulations, (7] low level 
solid waste is packaged depending on the amount o f radioactivity in 
the package. Typically, the waste is solidified in a mixture of 
vermiculite and cement in Type A steel drums. When filled, the 
individual drums weigh between 500 and 800 pounds. If the drums 
contain Type B quantities o f waste, the drums would require the 
addition o f a Type B “ overpack”  (i.e.. protective outer packaging) 
to provide accident protection for the drums. Low specific activity 
wastes or Type A quantities o f waste may be shipped in drums 
without protective overpacks.
Alpha Waste. Alpha waste is shipped either in a large accident proof 
box or in a bundle o f  55-gallon drums encased in some sort o f  outer 
protective container to protect such materials from impact and fire. 
Special railroad cars already constructed have been used to transport
the solid alpha wastes to a storage facility. Other methods and 
modes o f transportation may be used in the future.
Number of Shipments
Pattern of Shipments. Shipments would be nationwide, with the 
predominance in the east. Reactor locations as o f Dec. 31. 1973. are 
shown on Figure 5. Fuel processing plants are located in New York. 
Illinois, and South Carolina. Fuel fabricators are scattered 
throughout the east. Commercial waste burial sites are in New York. 
Tennessee, Illinois, Nevada, Washington, and Kentucky.
Fresh Fuel. Each year, on the average, about 1/3 to 1/5 of the fuel 
in a reactor is replaced with fresh fuel. Fresh fuel is usually shipped 
by truck, with 6 to 16 packages per truck. About 6 truckloads o f 
fresh fuel elements would be shipped to a reactor each year. For 
100 reactors, that’s 600 truckloads per year nationwide.
Spent Fuel. At present, all shipments of spent fuel are made under 
“ exclusive use”  arrangement, by truck or rail. Some barge shipments 
may be made in the future. There would be about 10 rail shipments 
or 40 truck shipments annually from each reactor to a fuel 
reprocessing plant. For 100 reactors, that’s 1.000 rail shipments or
4.000 truck shipments per year.
Radioactive Waste from Reactors. About 4.000 cubic feet o f low 
level waste per year would be shipped from a BWR. and about
1.000 cubic feet per year from a PWR. Most o f the-shipments 
would be made by truck. About 2.000 drums o f radioactive waste 
would be shipped, with about 40 to 50 drums per truckload, for 
about 45 truckloads per year for a BWR. For a PWR. there would 
be about 500 drums and 10 truckloads per year.
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Radioactive Waste from Reprocessing Plants
High-Level Waste. The first shipments of high-level waste from 
reprocessing plants are not expected until about 1983. By 1985, 
there will be about 25 shipments a year. By 2000, there will be 260 
shipments per year, for the three reprocessing plants. [18]
Low-Level Waste. Each reprocessing plant is expected to produce 
about 20,000 cubic feet of low level waste per year. There would be 
about 700 truckloads each year for three reprocessing plants.
Alpha Waste. Each reprocessing plant is expected to produce about
5,000 cubic feet of alpha waste per year. This would be about 30 
rail carloads or 150 truckloads each year for three reprocessing 
plants.
Accidents
Accidents occur in a range of frequency and severity. Most 
accidents occur at low vehicle speeds, but the severity of accidents 
is greater at higher vehicle speeds. Most severe accidents generally 
involve some combination ot impact, puncture, and fire effects. 
Even if the hazardous nature ot the cargo is not a factor, accidents 
often result in injury, death, and cargo or other property loss due to 
common causes.
Truck Accidents. In 1969, motor carriers reported [13] a total of 
about 39,000 accidents, 20.000 injuries, and 1,500 deaths. The 
injury rate is about 0.5 injuries per accident, and the death rate is 
about 0.03 deaths per accident. The accident rate for hazardous 
materials shipments was about 1.7 accidents per million truck miles.
Assuming 100,000 truck miles per year of transportation for 
each nuclear power plant, there would be about 0.09 injuries per 
year and 0.005 deaths per year per reactor. Those deaths and 
injuries would be from conventional or common causes not related 
to the radioactive nature o f the cargo.
The nonnuclear property damage rate is about S2.000 per truck 
accident. With 100.000 truck miles per year per reactor, this would 
be an average loss o f about S300 per year per reactor due to 
nonnuclear causes.
Rail Accidents. In 1969, the rail industry reported [14] about
8,500 accidents, 23,000 injuries, and 2,300 fatalities. The accident 
rate for rail accidents was about 1.4 accidents per million car miles.
There were about 2.7 injuries per accident and about 0.27 
deaths per accident. Assuming about 15,000 rail car miles per year 
per reactor, there would be about 0.06 injuries and 0.006 deaths per 
year per reactor, from conventional and common causes.
Nuclear Materials. To date, there have been no injuries or deaths o f 
radiological nature due to the transportation o f nuclear materials. 
[5] There have been a few cases o f truck drivers being killed or 
injured as a result o f a collision or overturn of vehicles carrying 
nuclear materials. In none o f these cases, however, was there any 
release of nuclear materials from Type B packages. [2]
In recent years, DOT has recorded [2 ]an average o f 40 to 50 
incidents per year involving the transportation of nuclear materials. 
Almost all o f these incidents involved Type A or exempt packages. 
In about 2/3 o f these cases, there was no nuclear material released
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from the packages. In a few percent o f  the cases, there was 
significant contamination requiring cleanup, with cleanup costs 
running into the thousands o f dollars.
Accident Ride
Principle o f  Risk. The significance o f radiological hazards during 
transportation o f nuclear materials can be properly evaluated only 
by considering together the consequences o f accidents and the 
probabilities o f those accidents. One could compare the risks o f 
transportation o f  nuclear materials in several ways. For example, 
one might compare the probabilities o f shipment accidents; 115,1 61 
one might compare the average cost o f accidents by each mode o f 
transportation; one might compare direct transportation costs, which 
includes insurance premiums. However, all of these partial measures 
for comparing risk may be combined into a single contingency risk 
cost factor which is the product o f the probability o f experiencing 
an accident involving nuclear materials and the probable cost o f 
such an accident if it occurs. In late 1972, the AEC completed a 
study [ 1 7 ] of this type o f comparison for nuclear reactor power 
plant transportation.
Accident Records. In estimating the radiation risk from accidents 
involving shipments of nuclear materials to and from nuclear power 
plants, one must consider: (1) the frequency and the severity o f 
accidents; (2) the likelihood o f package damage or failure; (3) the 
nature, amount, and consequences of releases o f radioactivity during 
an accident; and (4 ) the capacity o f coping with such releases.
The environmental effects [5 ] which might occur in transporting 
nuclear fuel and solid wastes resulting from the operation o f  a 
“ typical”  power reactor has been evaluated. [1 7 ]The risk analysis 
covers transportation of: (1) fresh fuel from a fabrication plant to a 
reactor by truck; (2) spent fuel from a reactor to a fuel reprocessing 
plant by truck, rail or barge; and (3) solid wastes from a reactor to 
a radioactive burial site by truck or rail. The range o f known
distances between various sites must be considered. Estimates may 
be made of radiation effects on the environment under normal 
conditions of transportation and for credible severe accidents. The 
potential accidents may be analyzed in terms o f severity and
predicted damage, and the probable consequences of releases.
Finally, by combining the probabilities o f accidents with the 
consequences, the overall risk o f transportation accidents may be 
estimated.
Normal Conditions. According to the AEC analysis, [ 17 J truck 
drivers and freight handlers would normally receive an average of 
about 0.2 to 0.3 millirem per shipment o f fresh fuel. No member o f 
the general public is likely to receive more than about 0.005
millirem per shipment. Most o f  the general public's exposure would 
be nonrepetitive in that no single member o f the general public 
would be exposed to those dose levels more than a few times per 
year. The most that any one member o f the general public might 
get during a year would then be perhaps 0.01 millirem or about 
1/50,000 o f his annual permissible exposure.
For spent fuel shipments and radioactive waste, each truck 
driver could receive as much as 30 millirem per shipment. A few 
members of the general public could receive as much as one 
millirem per shipment, or about 1/500 o f his annual permissible 
exposure.
Accident Probabilities
A study o f accident probabilities (16) showed that the 
frequency o f severe accidents for both truck and rail shipments is 
about one for each one hundred million truck miles or rail car 
miles. The probability of extremely severe accidents is about
100,000 times less. Considering the total number o f truck miles or 
rail car miles involved per reactor and estimating the predicted 
accident response o f packages, the study 116) shows that the
predicted likelihood o f  serious leakage arising from accidents 
involving packages o f nuclear materials to or from a nuclear power 
plant in any one year is about one in five million. By comparison, 
the likelihood o f  serious injury due to an automobile accident per 
person pier year is about one in 500.
The study [16]also shows that, in the transportation o f  nuclear 
materials, the probability o f injury or death due to common 
accident causes is at least 100,000,000 times greater than the 
probability of injury or death due to radiological consequences. 
Correspondingly, the total property and cleanup loss from 
nonnuclear common causes in transportation accidents is expected 
to be about $300, or about 2,500 times greater than the probable 
losses from radiological contamination. The total expected average 
loss from contamination in transportation per reactor year is about 
12 cents.
Conclusion
On the basis o f the studies referred to, it appears that the 
probability o f death, injury, or massive property loss due to 
transportation o f radioactive materials is (1 ) determinable, (2) not 
zero, and (3) very small. In projecting the total accident probability 
for transportation o f radioactive materials to and from nuclear 
power plants, it seems obvious that the radiological consequences o f 
the total accident spectrum will be several orders o f magnitude 
below the more common nonradiological causes. It further appears 
that radiation doses to transportation workers and the general public 
during the normal course o f transportation will be limited to a small 
fraction of the total permissible annual dose, and then only to an 
extremely small segment o f the population. The various studies 
show clearly that the likelihood o f a catastrophic nuclear transport 
accident is so infinitesimal that, for all practical purposes, it can be 
confidently said that one will never happen.
The risk is small, but is it acceptable? And to whom? Modem 
life confronts people with a multitude o f risks. We don’t live in a 
riskless society, nor could modern technological societies exist on 
that basis. Each person has his own idea o f what risks are acceptable 
to him. The public apparently judges the convenience o f air travel 
to be worth the risk that results in 200 fatalities per year; the 
convenience o f  driving an automobile is considered worth much 
higher levels o f  risk. Some people are afraid o f airplanes but ride 
motorcycles. Sometimes the public judgments are not especially 
rational. About 49 million Americans continue to smoke cigarettes 
despite the clear warning o f risk to their health printed on each 
package. Others smoke heavily but take a vitamin pill every day to 
stay healthy. Many people are afraid o f the potential hazards o f 
nuclear power, but risk their necks every day in the hazardous 
reality o f highway travel. Some say that risks which they choose to 
accept are acceptable, but risks which others force on t)iem are not. 
In each case, the acceptability is most likely to be based on 
subjective emotional reactions-“ gut”  feelings-rather than a logical 
analysis o f accident data or other actual experience. Few o f us are 
afraid o f  being bitten by a venomous snake, or being attacked by a 
rhinocerous, in the middle o f Washington. D.C.. but that probability 
is also ( l )  determinable. (2) not zero, and (3) very small.
Certainly laws and regulations themselves will not guarantee 
risk-free transportation. We are all aware o f the potential risks in 
nuclear matters if safety is not given the very close attention it 
deserves. Transportation accidents and their potential effects on 
shipping containers have been well studied. These studies continue. 
It is precisely because o f  this perceived risk that the AEC has always 
inposed stringent and overlapping protective measures in their 
concept of “ defense in depth." However, one cannot claim 
“ assurance”  as an absolute. No safety system can nor should it be 
expected to guarantee complete safety o f a few individuals who by 
very exceptional circumstances, peculiar habits, unusual customs, 
extreme deviations from the typical individual get into difficulties.
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Even the normal industrial safety limits for a variety o f hazardous 
stresses provide only reasonable protection for typical workers, and 
no more than that.
We tend to react to the problem of risk by making choices 
based on the magnitude o f the risk, as we perceive it, and the 
benefits to be gained from accepting the risk.
The National Academy of Sciences has stated, “ Whether we 
regard a risk as acceptable or not depends on how avoidable it is, 
and how it compares with the risks o f alternative options and those 
normally accepted by industry.”  As a result o f the studies which 
have been done, it is the AEC’s opinion [18]tliat, with regard to 
nuclear shipments:
a. We have enough facts and figures on the hazards to allow a 
more objective evaluation o f the risk acceptability than we 
might derive solely from “ gut”  feelings.
b. The risk o f public catastrophe has been eliminated by strict 
standards, engineering design safety, and operational care. 
Whatever the consequences o f an accident are, the public hazard 
will be manageable, and the nuclear effects will be small 
compared to the nonnuclear effects.
c. The long-term public burden o f not transporting nuclear 
materials is likely to be higher than the risks o f  carefully 
controlled transportation, considering the various options 
available.
d. The likelihood of death, injury, or serious property damage 
from the nuclear aspects o f nuclear transportation is thousands 
o f times less than the likelihood o f  death, injury, or serious 
property damage from more common hazards, such as 
automobile accidents, boating accidents, accidental poisoning, 
gunshot wounds, fires, or even falls—all things which we can 
control, but apparently have accepted as a way o f life without 
much public support for reduction o f  risk.
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